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modernity, and then for the opus operatum, that iso differentiation and
rationalization as possible outcomes.2
I start by restating two classieal problems of soeiologieal theorizing.
The first is the Durkheimian problem of relating the process of social
differentiation to the conditions producing it.3 Ho\\' does differentiation
come about? What forces underlie the process? Durkheim's ans\\'er is
~nsatisfactory: he takes demographie growth and inl;easing sociaJ den-
sny as the central causal variables for the progressive dissolution of co)Jec-
tive conseiousness (and the individualization resulting from it). Thus the
key to explaining modernization is u!timately dcmography. something
nonsocial (but as we kno\\', soeially produced!).
The second problem is the 'Veberian problem of relating the proeess
of rationalization to the soeial conditions producing it.ol Ho\\' does ratio-
nalization come about? Weber gives a historical answer. He identifies
specific social groups as the carriers of the process and then relates these
groups to the general sociaI structure, that is, the system of status, dass.
and power. Thus modernization is explained thro~gh the more or less
contingent historical emergence of specific social groups. For Weber it is
history that ultimately explains modernization.
The alternati"e theoretical approach {Q Durkheim and Weber is that
of Marx. Marx's theory states that the e\'olutionary change of society (a
change that has been conceptualized by later theorists as differentiation
and rationalization) is the produet, first, of the contradietions between
the forees of produetion and t~e social relations of production and,
second, of the contradictions between social classes. Ultimatelv, contradic-
tions are the causes of modernization.5 '
Within the Marxian theoretical framework social development is a
process based on two types of eontradictions. The first type is a contradic-
tion between social actors, that is, the conBiet between social classes. As
long as contradictions are understood as contradictions between social
groups, the theary explains lhe development of society throuah aenu-
inely social factors. The second type refers to a more abstract c~nc~ptof
2. Such a maerosociological foeus on the conditions generating societ)' is prominent in
Freneh sociology. For two (very different) versions see Touraine 1977 and Bourdieu 1984.1
take the distinetion between modus operandi and opus operatum from the lauer.
3. Alexander (this volume) deseribes this Durkheimian problem as being one of relaling
general models, soeial proeesses, and hislOrieal analyses of speeifie strains and tensions. My
chapter can be read as an altempt to relate these levels.
4. For a treatment of the Weberian problem see Schluchter 19i9, 1981. Going bevond
\~reber, Schluchter tries to develop the general model of rationalization, lea\'ing the ques.
non of social processes and hislOrical analyscs more 01' les~ aside.
5. See Godelier 19i3 for a s)'stematic discussion of Man::'~ cli~tinctionsbelween le\'cIs of
eontradiction.
\.
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Contradictions and Social Evolution
A Theory of the Social Evolution of Modernity
Klaus Edel"
1. A CRITIQCE OF ~IODER='lZATlO~THEORY
1.1. The Ke)' Concepts: Differentiation and Rationalization
The classieal theory of modernization is based on the ~eneral :v?lution-
ary assumption that modernization is the. result of differentIatIon and
rationalization. However, the extent to ",hleh these p~oeess~s are neees-
sary aspects of modernization is an open question. Dlseuss.lOns of .m?d-
ernization must at least ask about the extent to whieh dedlfferentIatI?n
and derationaIization are also developmental processes that charactenze
modern societies. 1 If these counterprocesses can be shown to be part of
modemization then differentiation and rationalization are only .tWO
among the m~ny possible results of the ~volut~on of modern. sOClet~.
They then lose the explanatory power that IS attnbuted to them m classl-
cal modemization theöty. . . - . . .
The real problem is that differentiation and rauon~hzauon are .not
variables explaining modernization, but processes ne.edl11? e~planatIon.
In other words, I propose that differentiation and :auonahzauon are not
causes, but effects of modernization. My strategy IS to look ~or the p:o-
cesses producing and reproducing these effects. The theoretIcal startmg
point is to look first for the modus operandi, a generative structure of
1 For recent contributions to the theory of modernization in terms of dif~eren~ial~on
see Smelser 1985 and Luhmann 1982; for modernization theory in terms of r~lJonah~Uo:
see, among others, Habermas 1981 a~d. Schluehter 1981. For the the~r~u~l pr~is ::1-
posed by the processes of dedifferenuaUOIl and reenchantmcnt se~ Tlrpklan (t and
urne); pleas for reenchantment are found (among many ethers) In Berman 1984
Moseovici 1976. .
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1.2. Evolutionary TheoT)' and Modemization
I propose the following preliminary theoretical assumption: contradic-
tions are mechanisms that initiate or continue communication. Insofar as
societies are the most complex system of communication, contradictions
can be treated as the mechanisms for the evolution of such sl'stems.9 This
hypothesis entails an evolu~ionary theory that draws from beyond the
old alternatives of an epigenetic mysticism and a Darwinistic func-
tionalism.lO It takes c:;ontradictions as the mechanism producing modern-
izing processes like (functional) differentiation and rationalization.
6. This structural notion of contradietion has often been criticized as being "objectiv-
istic." Such a critique can be found in Habermas' 1979, ",ho relates this type-of contra~ic­
tion to the problem of system integration as opposed to social integration. See also Sahhns
1976, who distinguishes two "historical materialisms," one of which is guilty of the objectiv-
istic sin.
7. See Sjoeberg 1960; Offe 1972.
8. A systematic treatment of the notion of contradiction is found in Elster 1978, (esp.
chapters 4 and 5); Luhmann 1984, (488ff.); Miller 1986, (esp. 296ff.).
9. Evolution is not to be conceived as the change of society or some of its subsystems-
to do so 'would be a ease of misplaced concreteness-but as the evolution of structures that
regulate the construction of the system (and its subsystems). Such structures are assumed to
be on the level of social evolution structures regulating communication.
10. The differences between Darwinistic and epigenetic theories ean be reduced to
_differences in the concept of contradiction. Either evolution is conceived of as the resolu-
tion ofcontradictions between systems and their environments (the old Darwinistic explana-
tory strategy) or it is conceived of as the resolution of a general con~~dic~on.un~erlyil.lg
the history of humankind (an idea that is related to the otd progressl\'JSt thmkmg m soclal
theory).
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This .hy~othesis ch~nges the evolutionary assumptions underlying
modermzatlon theory 10 a fundamental wal'. I discuss two modifications
here. First, modernization theory should not be tied to the idea of a fixed
and unidirectional path of development to modern society. Differentia-
tion is not an ex~lanat~ryvariable but only a descriptive category that says
th.at ther~ ~re 1Ocreas1Ogly more fields of social conflict and struggle.
Dlfferen~latlonm~st therefore be described as the structural by-product
of collectlve practlces that produce a modern social order. Second, mod-
ernization theory is not to be tied to the idea of a self-propelling force
(re~son?r~nre~sonfor example) that pushes social development. Rather,
ratlonahzatlon IS the cultural by-product of collective practices that con-
struct a cult~ral order through learning processes and symbolic struggles,
both of whl.ch together establish legitimate authority and generate the
symbols sOClety needs to reproduce itself as a legitimate social order.
. A~ a substitute for the two evolutionary assumptions that moderniza-
tlon IS self-propelling and unidirectional,l1 I propose the idea that contra-
diction~open up d.iverging and even incompatible paths of development.
Ther~ IS no prescrI?ed way to and through modernity. There are as many
ways 1Oto modermty as there are historical developments. Therefore.
modernization theory cannot be constructed by conceptualizing its out-
come but only by conceptualizing the way this modern order is produced.
The problem then is to conceptualize and explain the social production
ofm~dernsociety. ~he conception I propose is threefold. First, it suggests
- 100k1Og at the learmng processes of those social groups that create a new
collective consciousness, that is, political and social ideas, to orient individ-
ual and collective social action. 12 But because these learning processes are
part of a larger historical environment, we must also look further.
Second, we must consider the idea of class conflict. Class conflict
should be conceptualized on the level of the system of status and power.
In order to reproduce agiven system of status and power, social classes
engage wherever possible in struggles to classify and reclassify each
other. They struggle to have "right" on their side. The symbolic universe
of righ~, .the idea of morality, sometimes even universal morality, has to
be moblhzed to secure the reproduction of the class structure. U
11. For an analysis of the pitfalls of o/d evolutionary theories see Habennas 1979. For a
critique of Habennas's alternative see Schmid 1982. But the alternative Schmid (1982)
proposes also remains unsatisfactory.
12. The following discussion is an attempt to loeate the fonnal struetures of learning
processes, as described by Miller 1986. within a historieal contexL For an extensive discus-
.:- sion see Eder 1985a.
..,::..13. The role of the symbolic dimension in Marxist thinking has already been elaborated
_. by God.elier. For a sh~rt and instruetive account see Godelier 1978. For an interesting
_:-.theoretlcal refonnu.latlon of this problem see Bourdieu 1984. ..
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contradiction. In it social structures rather than social actors are seen to
contradict each other.6 The configuration of social structures is supposed
to set into motion the evolution 'of society. This abstract use of the notion
ofcontradiction has become relatively important in more recent theoreti-
cal thinking: contradictions between systems are seen as leading to self-
blockading situations and contradictions within systems as generating
incompatible functions that the systems fulfil!.7
But these functionalist reinterpretations run the danger of an analyti-
cal nominalism that is empty of anl' social theory. I consider communica-
tion theory to be a more promising theoretlcal approach to a reinterpre~
tation of the Marxist approach of explaining social change because it is
more adequate to the study of modernization than functionalist and
neofunctionalist reinterpretations of Marx. In communication theory
the analyst can give a systematic place to the concept of contradiction.8
Reformulated in this way, the concept of contradiction becomes the start-
ing point for a more adequate theory of modernization.
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Third, my eoneeption examines how differentiation and rationaliza-
tion are related to the evolution of modernity. I explain them as the
struetural by-produets, that is, the combined effeets, of learning pro-
cesses and dass eonHiet that in turn reproduee these generating condi-
tions. Learning processes and dass eonHiet change the social and eultural
dimensions of the strueture of soeiety. They lead to what Weber has
ealled the differentiation and rationalization of H'ertsphären. 14 This mod-
ern differentiation between moral, aesthetie, and theoretieal symbols
restriets the possible images of a legitimate soeial order to the moral
sphere. In modern times this differentiation of the moral sphere (which
structurally is probably the most important one) can no longer be
grounded on a holy order, that is, a hierarchy, but onl)' on the abstract
and formalistic idea of a soeial order based on the egual agreement of
those belonging to ie
With ·this theoretical program the reformulation of the notion of con-
tradiction in communication theory should aUow for the revision of the
theoretical assumptions underlying the coneeptualization of differentia-
tion and rationalization as the paths to modernization and offer new
grounds for describing the proeesses of modernization. And on a more
general level it should allow for the revision of the implicit evolutionary
assumptions of modernization theor)'.
In the following sections I discuss how the concept of the soeial pro-
duetion of modernity can be made fruitful in a systematic (not historieal)
reconstruction of developmental processes in modern society. First, I
discuss the role of learning processes in the sOclaTproduction of modern
societ)'. These processes take place first in "enlightenment societies"
(Aufklärungsgesellschaften) that call themselves "associations" in order to
differentiate themselves from "corporations" and from the corporate
groups of traditional society such as guilds, estates, etc. These associa-
tions contain the elementary structures of speeifically modern eollective
learning processes. Next, I attempt to locate this evolutionary new type
of association within the social structure of early-modern society. Here
the specificity ofmodern socia! classes and the corresponding dass eon-
Riet become the analytical foeus.
This analysis then allows me to describe the evolution of modern
society 3.s one that is generated by learning processes and dass conHiets
and reprodueed by processes of differentiation and rationalization. Dif-
ferentiation is the key part of the mechanism that reproduces these
generating conditions. But differentiation is in itself insufficient; it must
also mobi~i!e symbolic resources in order to continue reproducing differ-
14. See Habennas 1981. who uses Weber's distinction of WertsphäTt1I for his own at-
tempt to differentiate between various irreducible claims of validity constituting communi-
cative action.
2. THE SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF MODERNITY
entiation. Rationaliza~ion is the proeess produeing the symbolie re-
sources ne~de? for thl~ repfo~u~tion.The analysis of the reproduetion
~f ~lOderl1lzatlonby differentiation and rationalization gives some pre-
hmmary answers to. two centra! problems in modernization theory: the
pr~ble~ of alternatl~'e paths to modernization and the problem of the
ratlonahty of these different paths to modernization.
325C01'\TRADICTIO!\S AND SOCIAL E\"OLLJTI01'\
2.1. Assuciatioll and Comlllimication
Sin.ce the beginning of modernity certain socia! groups that are eharac-
tenzed by an evolutionary new form of communieation have had a
profoun~ effect. in triggering modernization proeesses. Such groups tr)'
to orgamze thelr mode of organization aeeording to the principles of
~he egual ~nd discursive handling of disputes. 15 This type of discourse
~s based-IdeaUy-on the free and egual exchange of arguments, that
15, on Aufklärung (enlightenment). Associations are the socia! contexts
within which this evolutionary new type of discourse can take plaee.
I would !ike to distinguish among three historical manifestations of
a.ssociation.s in modern society. The first is tied to the rise of groups that
smee the elghteenth eentury have identified themselves as the bearers of
enlightenment. 16 Within these groups social and politicallife is discussed
in a way that differs fundamentally from the past. This form of coUective
diseussion, which is-Iearned in small political and private associations,
forces thes~ associa.tions ~o describe themselves in a way that is indepen-
dent of thelr place m a hlerarehy. They begin, instead, to describe them-
selves as part of a socia! movement, as Aufklärungsbewegung.
A second historical manifestation of the modern type of associations is
that found in the working dass movement. 17 The eulture of discussion
_ [ound in the working dass movement continues the tradition of the
Enlightenment. The difference between the associations of the worki~g
dass movement and the earlier associations of the Enlightenment is in
the eontent of the discussion. The discourse organized in the associations
of the working dass allows for learning the competence needed for
. 15. This observation should not be mistaken for the claim that these associations have
actually functioned in this manner. I only claim that these principles define the structural
.:;__ model of these associations.
- 16. Important descriptions of this phenomenon are Nipperdey 19i2 and Koselleck
[1959] 1973. For a systematic sociological treatment see Eder 1985a, (67ff.).
-e~~ 17. !he ~dea of tr:a~ing th~ ,:"orking dass movement as a collecuve learning process is
~a~ old Idea In the soclahst tradluon. See, e.g., Na'aman 1978 and Vester 1970, ",ho utilize
~tlllS conc~pt ~or a reco~st,:,ction of the labor movement; see also Thompson I9?8. Also
:-r.e1evant In thlS context 15 Tijl~ 1978.
-~
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organizing the workers aS:i collective soeial force. Thus,the spedfic sodal
experiences of the workers modify the contents, but not the form, of the
discourse of the eighteenth-century associations.
A third historical manifestation of the modern type of associations is
the associations that have emerged since the end of the last century in the
petit bourgeois classes. But the social experiences necessary for these
"middle" dasses to produce an autonomous discourse arise only in the
second half of the twentieth century when the old petit bourgeoisie is
complemented and strengthened by a new petit bourgeoisie1S [hat is the
result of the 'increasing professionalization of work. The associations of
these new soeial groups describe themselves today as "new" social move-
ments. These new associations defend a private "Iife-world" that differs
from both the just society defended by the working dass and the public
sphere qefended by the bourgeois/citoyens. This new life-world is their
own private world, their own psychic and physical integrity. Thus the
specific experiences of these groups modify the coment of discourse, but
they do not modify its logic.
In all these groups a reflexive use of communication is practiced. As
people learn to communicate about communication, they revolutionize
the traditional order. The evolution of modern society becomes depen-
dent on the communication that is the subject ofcommunicative relation-
ships. Reflexivity in communication is the staning point for the social
production of modern society. Those who participate in modern associa-
tions know that they are taking part in a colJective learning process. In the
Aufklärungsgesellschaften of the eighteenth century (the Jacobin clubs were
their radical variants), the Arbeiterbildungsvereine of the nineteenth century
(the assoeiations for the self-education of the workers), and the therapy
groups of the late-twentieth century, the function of learning has become
part of the process of communication. The mechanism constituting the
modern associations since the eighteenth centurycan therefore be de-
fined as discursive communication. 19
The form ofcommunication practiced in these associations throughoUl
modernity changes the form and the content of the learning processes
taking place in these associations. Thus the idea of an evolutionary
new type of Iearning is the theoretical key to the cultural consequences
of the emergence of associations since the beginning of modern soci-
ety. Cultural change in modern society is produced by a coJIective
learning process whose logic is defined by the logic of discursive com-
18. For a controversial discussion of the social-structural basis of the new sodal move-
ments see Offe 1985; Eder 1985b; Bourdieu 1984.
. 19. The concept ofdiscursive communication has heen elaborated by Habennas (1981).
The following text can also be read as an application of this type of sociological theorizin g
to the theory of modemization. '
munication. Cultural change, then, IS bound to the logic of modern
discourse.
2.2. Collective Learning Processes
The constitutive element of discursive communication is a "generative,"
or "deep," structure. This structure is defined by twO principles: equality
and the discursive handling ofconRicts. The logic ofdiscursive communi-
cation is structured according to the principles that we ascribe as being
central to modernity.zo The Jogic underlying the modern discourse thus
allo\\'s for learning processes that are fundamentally different fron: tr~di­
tional ones. These modern learning processes are based on the pnnClple
of ceaselessly testing the universalizability of the normative order of ci\'il
societv. Their mechanism is the resolution of contradictions by argumen-
tation' or "critique." They are modeled according 10 the logic of a univer-
salization procedure. . ....
A universalization procedure is defined as the Impartlal conslderatlon
bv evervbodv concerned. The basic structure of an impartial judgmem
is' "equ~lity ~ore geometrico." Equality more geometr~come~ns ~o con-
sider onlv the behavioral manifestation of an act, not ItS motivations or
circumst~nces. This basic structure must then be applied to a specific
case. First, impartiality can be described as giving everyone an equal
chance to act in his or her own interest. This condition is the equality of
opportunity. A second way to construct a situation .of imp~~tiality.is ~o
distribute chances to act in such a wav thatall posslbl,e posItIons wuhm
the distribution are acceptable to aU.' This condition is the equality of
differential chances to act. The Iogical structure of the operation of the
principle of the equal consideration of eve~y?ody ~ecomes 10gicaJIy
more complex in both cases. In the first case It IS apphed to an abstr~ct
other; in the-second case the relevant other becomes somebody wnh
needs that dash with yours, a situation that has to be taken into account
within the procedure of universalization. Going from the first to the
second level, the hypothetical operation takes additional empiricalpa-
rameters into account. The problems inherent in these approaches re-
sult in a third way of describing impartiality: the unequal distribution of
chances to claim the universality of wants and interests within a process
of collective discussion. This condition is the equality of communicative
relationships. .
Thus we can distinguish three steps in the development of the loglc of
20. For an interesting thcoretical treatment of the model of civil society see Dumont
1957. 1970. For an early treatment of its discursive aspects see Habermas 1962. For a
systematic use of both nations for a reconstruction of modernization processes see Edcr
19853 (87ff.). I,
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universalization~l that uncl~rlies collective learning processes since the
eighteenth century. The form of communication invented and practiced
by the early associations (the societies of enlightenment) has become the
foundation for the model of modern society. This model is civil society.
This model sets forth the characteristics of association-the equal rights
to free thinking. speech, and association-as basic to civil society. The
more this complex learning can be organized, the more the idea of a
democratic organization of civil society can be radicalized into the postu-
late of the democratic organization of the welI-being of society. This idea
culminates in the idea of the democratic i-ealizati011 of the good life by
civil society.22 The theoretical proposition is that these increasingll' com-
plex forms of a civil societl' are incorporations of the logic of the learning
processes that have been going on since the eighteenth century. This
development, then, can be conceptualized as the manifestation of collec-
tive learning processes using the logic of universalization as its basic
mechanism.
2.3. Social Class and Class Confiict
The concept of discursive communication is insufficient for explaining
the produetion of a social order in modern society because discursive
communication cannot control its institutional environment. On the con-
trary, it sometimes even serves ends contradictory to its intentions. Asso-
ciatiom do not exist merely in the thin air of discussion. Being part of a
wider social co"ntext, they are not independent of the power system
inherent in the social order. They are bound to an institutional frame-
work. And the symbolic universe produced by discursive communication
is used for legitimating purposes within this institutional framework. To
grasp this aspect of the social reality of modern society, we have to look
for the social struggles accompanying and controlling the processes of .
discursive communication.
Associations are part of the dass structure of society. This being so,
contradiction comes imo playas a mechanism of dass struggle. Class
conAict thus constitutes a social reality beyond the collective learning
processes initiated in associations. This social reality has been described
21. Habermas's theor}' pf communicative action (1981) can be read as the theoretical
program of the reconstruction of this type of universalization procedure. A theoretical
solution to the problem of developmental logic is the idea of a permanent social contract
(Eder I986a). This solution offers an alternative to Kohlberg's (1981) psychological concep-
tion of developmentallogic. See also Eder 1985a (67ff.); Tugendhat 1980.
22. For a discussion of the development of democratic rights see the c1assic work of
Marshall (1950). But it should not be forgotu:n that these ideals are taken from lhe lhc:oreli-
cal work of intellectuals, ",ho are lied more or less to the' different social and political
groups and movementsproducing modern society.
..,.•...
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since the beginning of the nineteenth century as a reality structured
according to dass-specific opportunities and rights. "'hether such dasses
correspond to concrete groups has been the object of controversy.23 Bu t
in modern societies dass has become a specific wal' of describing social
differences in society. How far the implicit self-description is adequate
varies historicalh-.
Since the eighteenth cemury the dassification of the objective posi-
tions that separate social dasses has followed a different logic from that
underll'ing the previous cIassification of estates. The transition in earl)"-
modern society to a ne,\" 10gic of c1assification ,ras a result of freeing the
social order from traditional bonds and was pan of the process of com-
mercializing agriculture and handicrafts. The ne'\' social order became
different from traditional bonds because the unifying hegemony of the
church was broken. 24 \\"ithout the church a societ)· without religious
bonds arose. In order to substitute for hierarchical cIassification,a ne\\"
cIassification svstem had to be built into the social structure.
During the transformation of traditional society into early-modern
society social relations remained organized around the bonds of patron-
dient relationships. Class relations were established, as Thompson puts
it,25 between the patrician culture anel the plebeian. The patrician cul-
ture was organized around the idea of autonomy and self-determination
in private life. The plebeian culture, however, was organized as a "moral
economy." The moral economy was opposed to the market economy; it
defended"Just" prices against market prices and the principle of con-
crete reciprocity against the principle of suhjective rights. Taking the
example of eighteenth~centuryEngland, the structure of these dass rela-
tions can be described as gentry-crowd reciprocity.26 The gentry, which is
defined as a polite culture dissociating itself from the plebeian culture of
the crowd, employed the dassical means of control: the majesty and
terror oflaw and the symbolism of their cultural hegemon}'. Both contrib-
uted to the theatrical represemation of patrician culture. The plebs,
however, had at their disposal the elements of a traditional culture: t~e
23. For a new sociological look at the concept of dass see Luhmann 1985. Luhmann
treats dasses as emerging from processes that make interactive relations increasingly secon-
dary for social structure. But his discussion suffers because he confuses dass structure and
differentiation-as-stratification.
24. For the English example see Thompson 1978 (133ff.).
25. Thompson 1974 (382ff.).
26. For this "cuhural" definition of dass relations see Thompson 1974 (397-98). This
definition is formulated in opposition to those definitions of class society that are too
narrO\'.. and too economic in nature. The same may be said of Calhoun 1982. It is impor-
Lant Lu see nOl oniy "das;' but abo "dass relations:' This point has been emph~ized by
Kumar (1983), who points out that dass action cannOl be explained when dasses are seen as
isolaled entities with no relalioriship to ether dasses.
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moral eeonomy. The struggles between soeial dasses were still struggles
for the reeonstruetion of the traditional good soeiety and were struggles
between traditional status groups. Thus the eonRiet between these dass
eultures funetioned like a bridge between the old and the new.
As soon as dass eonRiet is identified as being eoneerned with the soeial
organization of industrial work the dassifieation underlying dass eonRiet
becomes more dearly defined. Soeial dassifieation starts 10 be thought of
as the result of individual effort. But the classifieation of soeial reality ean
still be redueed to a dichotomy: to the eontradietion between eapital and
labor. Classes are eonstrueted around the eontradietion between those
who seil wage labor and those who buy itY But eontrary 10 the preindus-
trial phase of modern society, both faetors, eapital and labor, are defined
in ways that are independent of cultural or political traits. Cultur~ and
politics beeome the superstrueture, something aetually seeondary 10 de-
scribing the cJass structure of industrial society. The further development
of modern soeietv, however, has ealled this dichotomy into question.
Later, with the' withering away of the industrial model of development
and the eoming of "postindustrial" soeiety, a new contradiction appears
between soeial groups defending teehnocratic progressivism and those
defending a eommunicative life-world. Today class eonRiet is being tra~s­
formed into a fluid antagonism that reaches into every aspect of sOGal
life. Class eonRiet has expanded in time as weIl; it has beeome permanent
dass eonRiet. The soeial reality created by this permaneney is a system of
classifieation that radicalizes the individualist premises of the modern
system of dassification. This system of dassification that eompares indi-
viduals and that counts the (economie and eultural) eapital they own
results in the highly individualized dass strueture of modern society.28
These ways of classifying people ereate apower diserepaney between
social groups that has 10 be shown to b~ normal; th~ d~serepaney~ust be
seen as being legitimate.29 Class eonfhet neeessanly lS aecompamed by
praetiees that generate the legitimating symbolie order. The purpose of
27. This interpretation of dasses differs from the conceptions mat se~ dasses as con-
crete social groups. Rather than trying to identify the groups that consutute a das.s, m.y
theoretical approach construclS dasses theoretically and tries to find out whethe~ hIs lOrl-
cally these classes actually emerged. I expect that any identity between theoretlcal con-
struclS and hislOrical dasses will be an exceptional case.
28. This development can only be grasped by a theoretical approach t~at .constructs
classes as clusters of indicators that are shared by individuals. When such mdlcators he-
come diversified, empirical classes are increasingly less bound to a single or several co~­
crete social groups. Today, c1asses can be described as highly "individualized." For thls
point see Beck 1983.
29. Bourdicu (1980, 1984) has developed at length the idea of collective illusions as
systematically distoned visions of the world. Theoretically, this notion is, so far, the most
interesting sociolo~calreformulationof th«: old concept of ideology.
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legitimating practices is therefore to make the existing relations between
individuals appear to be normal relations. Resolved in this wa)', legitima-
ting praetiees allow for the symbolic reproduction of the dass strueture
of a society. The symbols favored by those who are on top are the sym-
bols daiming universal validity beeause sueh symbols produce the most
perfect image of legitimaey for the dass structure of modern soeiety.
Thus on the level of dass conflict, another logic of cultural change inter-
venes. Cultural ehange is not only the result of learning proeesses but
also the result of dass-specifie symbolie praetices.
2.4. Legitimatillg Practices
The produetion and reproduetion of dass structure is dependent on the
symbolie practices by whieh classes try to maintain their differences. For
this purpose symbolie resources are used to legitimate the class struc-
ture.30 Class eonRiet produees not onl)' a soeial relation but also a sym-
bolie relation. This symbolie relation serves as a speeifie meehanism for
organizing and reorganizing the symbolic universe that legitimates mod-
ern society. A look at modern history might clarify this point.
In the sixteenth and seventeenth eenturies prinees and the newl)'
established parliaments tried to break the sovereignty of religious au thor-
ity by postulating a ne\\' basis for legitimizing politieal domination: the
welfare of the people. 3 ! This seeular ground for domination legitimated
either the absolute sovereignty of the king or the representative sover-
eignty of the estates. Th~ plebs still lived in the ald warld of the moral
eeonomy, whieh was eulturally opposed to both the world of the absolute
prinee and the world of the ne\\' estates. The ensuing struggles on the
symbolie level were struggles between the modern and the traditional
world. Thus the symbolie praetiee of the absolutist state (eonstrueted as
the praetiee of the rule of law) was opposed to the symbolie order of
traditional life (defined as the pract:ee of eustomary law) -that was de-
fended by the iower classes.
At the beginning ofthe industrial revolution a new field of symbolic
struggle was added. The dominanee of the old dass eultures was broken
by the rising bourgeoisie, whieh transcended these eultural worlds with
its idea of an individualistic and competitive soeiety, a society based on
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"industria." lt was legitimated by a radically individualistic ethic, the
Protestant work ethic, and its telos of never-ending maximization and
perfeetion. This dass made the individualistic society of a market econ-
omy the symbolic world shared by both the upper and the lower dasses.
The legitimating practices based on this symbolic world led to the model
of dass relations that was created in nineteenth-century Europe between
the labor mO\"ernent, on the one hand, and the organizations of the
industrial elites, on the other hand. This model conceived ofthis relation-
ship as agame between pressure groups bent on maximizing power and
imerests. 32 It conceived of the capital-labor relationship as a bargaining
one. This symbolic world created the illusion that was necessary for the
reproduction of this individualistic and competitive society. This illusion
helped to reproduce-at least for a time-the dass structure of modern
society in its industrial phase of developmem.
The developrnental dynamic of ad',anced industrial societies again
changes its field of symbolic struggle. The world of the unlimited devel-
opmem of the industrial forces of produetion is replaced by a new legiti-
mating practice: the programming of lhe economic, cultural, and social
reproduction of society. The cultural ",orld opposing such an encompass-
ing program developed in bOlh the working dass and the bourgeois
dasses. This de\"e!opment took the form of a romantic culture emphasiz-
ing naturalistic sentiments that are opposed lo the "coldness" of modern
economic and politicallife. In late-modern society a new "green" philoso-
phy, which is trying to develop another moral image of the good world,
carries on this tradition of a culture that is opposed to a world controlled
by the bureaucratic welfare state. The "ne"," social movements are explic-
itly opposed to the \\'elfare state; instead they speak of health, green
nature, and aesthetics, and they generalize the idea of the "good life"
into aB fields.33 The ensuing symbolic struggles between different "mod-
ernities," that is, beiween modernity and romanticism, legitimate a soci-
ety with a highly individualized dass structure.
The winners in these symbolic struggles try to produce the image of
defending claims that are universaBy valid. The daim of universalism is,
at least in modern societies, the most promising strategy to reproduce a
given class structure of society. If symbolic struggles arrive at defining
the symbolic world of the upper classes as the legitimate one, the lower
classes have to see their own existence as an illegitimate one. The degree
32. A history ofthe labor mo\'ement seen from a trade-unionist perspecti\'e is contained
in Kenda1l1975.
33. The new social movements manifest a conRict about the type of professional knowl-
edge that should be used for the reproduction of society. See Eder 1982. For the green
movement see Gahung 1986. Theones of postindustnal societies-with the exception of
Touraine 1981-generally miss this point.
I
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of legitimacy becomes lhe reference point für distinguishing social
groups. The history of legitimating practices34 is therefore the kev to an
understanding of the processes that constitute the symbolic uni\'~rse of
modern dass society.
The symbolic uni\"erse of law offers the exemplar)' case of thc pro-
cesses of legitimating the class structure of modern societ\·. On the one
hand, legal Darms fix the objeetive classification of legal ~ights. On the
other hand, law has symbolic power because it daims to have morality on
its side.35 Law is a mechanism that is used in different contexts for the
symbolic reproduction of an institutional ordc~. In ordc~ to anal\"ZC' this
function of the symbolic universe of the la\l', I use examples from the
history of legal and political thought.:lfi
At the beginning of the sixteenth eentury both traditions adopted the
new premises that there no longer existed a metaphysical order on whieh
political and sociallife could be built and that the anthropologieal nature
of man is the basic fact. These new premises emerged from the reflexive
structure of modern social thinking: social thought had become depen-
dent on the tlünker (and his nature) as such. Hobbes's Leviathan and the
radical Puritan theories of the covenant are examples of this radically
new kind of social thinking; they mark the beginning of the evolution of
modern representations of society.
The symbolie authority of the modern legal order is based on these new
normative grounds. There are three key ideas: the idea of the mainte-
nance of order by the rule of law; the idea that the state's funetion is to
maximize the welfare of its constituents; and the idea that a good way of
life must be defended against the consequenees of uncontrolled progres-
sivism. Order, welfare, and a good life are the normative grounds for the
symbolic authority of modern law.
The images of a legal order construeted on such principl~~ are the
most effective mechanisms for producing the illusion that is necessary
for the reproduction of society. The more complex the social structure of
modern society becomes, the more complex these images become. The
first idea, the idea of a formal legal order founded on the universajistic
principle of the reason of state, structures and legitimates the absolutist
34. For a sociological approach to the history of social mo\'ements and cultural struggles
in modern sociely see Eder 1986b. See also Eisenstadt 1981 and his comribUlion to this
volume, which focuses on the complementary aspect of the e1ites.
35. The old and polemicized problem of the relationship between the moral and the
legal is restated here in a ne..... way. For the c1assical sociological treatment see Durkheim
1950.
36. For ahistory of political thought that takes this perspecti\'e see Skinner 1978. For
legal history see .he abundant nineteenth-century German literature. FOI lhe ,ociulugi~ai
use of this literature see Edef 1985a (329ff., 396ff.).
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state that ended the religious wars by guaranteeing indifferenee to reli-
gious and social differenees, thus ereating order through law. The see-
ond idea ofa legal order takes into aeeount the fact that the modern state
has taken on the regulation of the eeonomie sphere, whieh up to that
time had been integrated into traditional forms of living. The telos of a
legal order is maximizing the welfare of a soeiety through law. The third
idea emerges from the dysfunetional eonsequences of maximizing soeial
weIfare. Because perfeet order is no longer produeed by regulative law,
"progress". ha~ to be correeted or, better, planned "by the people." The
law then dl~tnbut~s th~ chances to participate in the planning of society.
Law, concelVed pnmanly as procedural la\\", beeomes the incorporation
of the demoeratic creedY
Against the majesty of such a law the lower groups either mobilize a
eult.ural world beyond the law or-and this is the normal ease-eher
subJect themselves to the law, accepting its authority and thereby contrib-
uting to its authority. Thus law is one of the foremost meehanisms of
legitimating class structure. Legal practiees are the most important
among the symbolie practiees reproducing the power structure of soeiery.
3. THE EVOLUTION OF MODERNITY
3.1. The Social Reproduction 0/Modernity
In the preceding section I laid the foundations for a theory of the social
produetion of modernity. I identified the mechanism that launches pro-
cesses of social and, eultural change, but I have not yet described the
specifie nature of the processes launched. The processes of social and
cultural change that are seen as erucial by traditional modernization
theory are (funetionaJ) differentiation and (formal) rationalization.
Whether they are the master trends of change i"n the course of modern-
ization is a question that must be answered now.-My answer has two _
aspects. First, differentiation and rationalization can take different
courses than those ascribed to them in c1assieal modernization theory.
Second, there are differences in the "functionality" and "rationality" of
these processes that have tobe explicated.
The first of these processes, differentiation, is a structural arrange- .
ment to meet the functional consequences of two types of modernizing
forces: modern associations and modern dass structure. This structural
arrangement has to reproduce these generating forces. Otherwise, mod- :=
ernization cannot go on. Thus differentiation can be defined within my __:-
theoretical framework as the mechanism fo~ the sodal reproduction of~'::
37. A shon description of the stages of le~i;ti~'n can befound inHabennas1981" .
(2:527ff.), ._ . . .. ~
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these modernizing forces. A theory of differentiation describes how the
opus operaturn reproduces the modus operandi.
Classieal modernization theory says that in modern societies differen-
tiation takes on the course of functional differentiation, a course that is
different from the traditional course of stratificational differentiation.
The decisive innovation is the functional autonomy by whieh structural
arrangements are equally and without external constraints able to accom-
modate38 the functional consequences of the modernizing mechanisms.
By separating and multiplying the fields in which the construction of
modern society can take place, functional differentiation makes this ac-
commodation possible.
Thus differentiation allows modern societies to accommodate learn-
ing processes and class struggles by structurally separating the specific
spheres of action that are the objects of these collective anions. For
example, the economic system and the religious system are based on
funetionally specific ways of accommodating the consequences of mod-
ernizing activities. Economie dass struggle is no longer logically adapted
to enactment in the religious sphere of action (as in traditional society).
But there are still social struggles within the religious sphere, for
example, in conflicts between religious professionals and the lay public.
Specific class conflict occurs in the economic sphere and is manifest in
the distance between capital and labor. And there are analogous strug-
gles in the political and the cultural spheres. The most conclusive
example is theeffect of diffet:~ntiatingthe educational system from
other systems. The modern educational system reproduces the dass
structure of modern society much more efficiently than before, at the
same time guaranteeing the cognitive skills a complex, modern society
needs for its reproduction.39 Functional differentiation is the mechanism
by which the dominant elites reproduce their positions in an increasingly
.-- (:2,mplex modern society.
--- But such differentiation is not a master trend; it is the trend of the
masters. This observation implies that there is more than one path of
differentiation in modern society. Functional differentiation, I propqse,
reproduces dass structure by producing a distinctive structure for the
.~ - 38. The concept of "aeeommodation" has been proposed by Smelser (1985, 124). This
'" eoneept allows for the development of a more adequate idea of the funetionalit)", or "suc-
~. eess," of differentiation.
_ 39. The funetional differentiation of class eonRiet is normally thought of as the end of
..- dass contlict. This notion, however, presupposes a realistic definition of dass. that is, it
~~mplies that we already know what a dass eonsists of. 1argue that differentiation allows for
"',the reproduction ofdass strueture. The best example ofthis phenomenon is the role ofthe
_.. ucational system. For the rcproductive role of the differentiated educational system see
-Bourdieu 1984. I
"
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formation of relatively autonomous elites and for the deformation of the
people as the dients of these elites. Whether dedifferentiation takes
plaee depends on whether soeial forees are strong enough to get ricl of
their eonfinements to the speeific social spaees that, from the perspective
of the elites, are rational and to reclefine the social space in whieh they
aet. Sueh dedifferentiation mobilizes dass eonfliets that generate collec-
tive aetion beyond the established networks of communication to im'olve
those who do not vet communicate with eaeh other.40
Thus those who argue that the formation of elites is the most impor-
tant function of structural arrangements have to plead for funetionaj
differentiation. Those ",ho argue that the organization of the collective
interests of the lesser classes is the most important function must plead
against functional differentiation. Ultimately, functional differentiation
is an option, not a fate. Ir is a possiblebut not a necessary trend of
modernization. Using it as a master trend implies a value judgment. Ta
give theoretical distinctiveness to it contributes to its image of being
"rational."
3.2. The Cultural Reproduction 01 l\'1odernity
The ability of functional differentiation to dominate the process of mod-
ernization depends on its ability to reproduce the image of an egalitarian
social order. Thus a second form of the reproduetion of modern society
has to be taken into aecount: Rationalization allows for the cultural repro-
duetion of modernity. - .
As I have already indicated, in modern soeiety rationalization is the
result of a double pi-oduction of eulture: learning proeesses and prac-
tiees that legitimate dass differences. Collective learning processes eonsti-
tute the discourse within whieh modernity is made possible. Symbolic
praetices try to mobilize the universe of discourse- produeed in these
learning proeesses to iegitimate existing distributions of power and posi-
tions in modern society. The mechanism generating rationalization is,
first, diseourse in associational life and, second, the interest on the part
of social classes in legitimating their own position and illegitimizing the
positions of others.
Rationalization is the result of two types of generating conditions and
ean assume different forms. What holds for differentiation also holds for
rationalization: there is more than one path of rationalization in modern
society. Rationalization is made possible by both the disenchantment and
40. An interesting concept trying {Q mediate between differentiation and dediffercn·
tiation is lhe concept of "unevcn" differentiation. See Colomy 1985. BUI, uitilllalcl:~ hc .
remains tied to the elilisl perspective complememed by lhe idea that lhere must be strUC-
tures providing arefuge or ha\'en for crilical (i.e., powerless) elites.
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the reenchantment of the world. 4J The social preconditions for this dif-
ference are the differences between the high and the low cultures of
modern soeiety; both eultures are rationalized in different ways. Their
differenees consist in the differential use of the symbolic resources that
are at a soeiety's disposal. There are two ideal types of rationalization:
disenchantment, ",hich is related to the dominant groups in society, and
reenchantment, whieh is related to the dominated groups. Both pro-
cesses produce different images of the modern world, images that I refer
to as "official" and "unofficial." '''''hat looks, ",hen seen from the We-
berian perspecLive. like historical vaciIlation bct\l"een rationality and irra-
tionality can be seen as the ri\'alry bet\l"een an official and an unofficial
type of rationalization. This difference has become central in deciding
the course of modernization.
Among the best examples of the official version of rationality is legal ra-
tionality. There are, however, other symbolie universes based on this type
of rationality. For example, the symbolic universe of politieal discourse
and that of scientific discourse contribute in their specific manners to the
official rationality of modern society. Rationalization triggered by these
forms of rationality ends up, as Weber has argued, in disenchantment.42
Rationalization takes a different course when strong cultural move-
ments put a soeiety's accepted practices and ways of thinking, that is, its
hegemonieal symbolic order, into question.43 Such movements can be
brought about by psychic or ecological erises that cannot be resolved by
purely political.or economic means. Rationalization that takesa direetion
other than the official one ends up in reenchantment. Whether rational-
ization reallytakes this direction depends on the developmental paths set
by sueh cultural movements.
Reenehantment does not neeessarily mean "irrationalization." Re-
enehamment ean be based on the old symbolic resourees of religious
orientations.44 For example, we know the extent to whieh Catholie and
Protestant ideas still influence individual and group ehoiees in the continu-
ing path to modernization. We know the effect of non-Western religious
41. The discussion about disenchantmenl and reenchantmenl refers abo\'e a11 to the
religious aspects of rationalizalion. See Tiryakian (this volume). Lechner (1985) also takes
reenchantment into account but reduces the condilions leading to reenchantment to discon-
Ient, that iso to a negative orientalion toward social action. Thus lhe e1itist lheoretical stand
can be kept.
42. These examples of rationalizalion are ones identified by Weber. For a syslematic
discussion of lhe different aspeclS of rationaJization see Habermas 1981 (I: J 14ff.).
43. Cultural mo\'ements and countercultures are a difficult subjecl for lheoretical treat-
ment. For one allempt see Yinger 1982.
44. Rccnchantment. concei\'ed a~ the development of pomraditional religion. is a coun-
lerprocess to the process of secularizalion. For such arestatement of the notion of secular-
ization see Werblowsky 19i6. I.
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47. The concept of procedural norms has dose links with communication theory. This
point is examined later in this chapter. .
~ 48. The pathogenesis of modernity has been the topic of the dassical discussion concern-
"log the "German road to modernity." The centr;11 problem of this discussion has been
-'whether there is such a thing-as a "normal" road to modemity that can be attributed to a
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~ There are onl)' two ways out of this problem: either to postulate a
substantive normative eriterion of rationality or to identify the" social
conditions that are necessary for rationalization to oeeur. The first solu-
tion is tautological beeause such a postulate itself beeomes part of the
symbolie struggles pushing rationalization in whatever direetion. The
second solution is to see the social conditions of rationalization as the
"proeedural" norms-l7 that are necessary for rationalizaeion and to exam·
ine whether they are in evidenc'e and, if so, to what extent.
Reduced to its procedurai form, the llitimate ground of the rationality
of modernity, then, is that we can choose our symbolic orders, that we are
not stuck with any one type of rationality, and that we can at any time
abandon what we have ceased to accept rationally. Whether or not such a
rational olltcome is to be expeceed has to be treated as an open question.
Classieal modernization theory seems to have already decided this ques-
tion by describing modernization as rationalization. In the following
section, however, I show that this modernization is not necessarily a
rational one. Therefore, modernization eheory has to incorporate a
more explicit notion of rationality into its conceptual framework. I sug-
gest that we look for procedural rationality on the level of the conditions
I generating what has been called rationalization." As I have shown, rationalizing the modern social order is dependent. = on two mechanisms. First, rationalization is the net result of social strug·IL: gles between social c1asses. Second, these sodaI stmggles are dependent
- -- -~ on collective learning processes CO reproduce the cultural conditions of
_.._. their existence. Thus two mechanisms are necessary to arrive at a mod-~ ern social order. Although difficult to achieve, such a social order is even
. _ more difficult to reproduce. It has to be assured that learning processes
, _-.__ and class conflict can gQ on. When reproduction fails, then social develop-
ment regresses or is rigidified. The historical process becomes "pathologi-
~.ii;F=-" cal." The result of blocked dass conflicts and blocked learning processes
is ehe pathogenesis of modernity.48 .
Historically, pathological processes seem to predominate. Collective
learning processes are more often blocked than released. Associations
more often turn into forms of interaetion produdng enemies rather
than forms favoring learning processes. The history of modern associa-
tions is much more a history of private feuds than a history of Iearning.
EDER
traditions on the process of the social production of the modern social
order. Weber has proposed the difference between this-worldy and other-
worldy orientations to distinguish between different symbolic logics.
Beyond such religiously based forms of reenehantment another form
of reenchantment is ehe attitude toward nature. This form of re-
enchantment ehallenges the productivist image of modernity, whieh is
defined by its instrumental relation to nature, with a romantie image of
another modernity that is defined by the integration of society into na-
ture. This reenchantment leads co a rationalization of a more moral
kind. Weber ealled ·this mo~alization "material" rationalization.-I5 It ques-
tions the dominance of formal rationality and serves as the vehicle, as
Weber saw it, of an irrational rationalization.
But Weber's interpretation is misleading. Both proeesses are contradic-
tory form~ of rationalizing the modern world. In traditional societies
cultural differences center around the poles of orthodoxy and hetero-
doxy. In modern soeieties they center around the poles of formal and
material rationality. But how do we decide on their respective degrees of
rationality?
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3.3. Falling Short ofModerniwtion
The question of rationality comes up on both levels of the reproduction of
modernitv: on the level of differentiation and on the level of rationaliza-
tion. Wh~n funetional differentiation is substituted by segmentary forms
of differentiation;a: söciarstrucfure emerges that is unable co reproduce
the dass structure of modern socieey. Moreover, when rationalization is
replaced by a new magical image of the world, a cultural system emerges
that is unable to reproduce the collective practices underlying the produc-
tion of modernity. In this case a manifest regression occurs. But can we
describe such a development as "irrational"? In addition, on the levels of
differentiation and rationalization we are also confrontcd with antagonis-
tic paths to modernization. Whether one of these paths is more rational
than the other becomes a problem for a theory of modernizaeion.
The key to fbese problems is not the theory of differentiation but the
theory of rationalization because this theory contains the double prob-
lem: to look at ilie way the social order is rationalized and to identify ehe
criteria for distinguishing what is to be considered as rational. Thus ehe
fheory of rationalization eannot eseape the process of rationalization of
whieh it is part.46
45. The concept of material rationalization was originally developed by Weber using the
example of the legal postulates for justice." . " ~ .
,~ 46. _The refleXii-ity built into the idea of i-aiiol1ariUtfu~hasbeen treated by Habermas - -;
1981 (1:106-13). .
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The same applies to dass eonfliel. Often dass conRiet is neutralized by
populist appeals or redueed to an elitist struggle.~9
Either way, the result is eulturaI eonftiets that try to mobilize either the
moral majority or the moral minority. Faseism radiealizes the moral ma-
jority: it offers integrative formulas with raeist, nationalist, or imperialist
orientations. Terrorism is the radiealization of a moral minority and is
exemplified by the Jaeobin terror after the Freneh Revolution, the terror
of Stalin, and that of the Khmer Rouge. Whether dass eonRiet ends up
as faseism or moral terror depends on the eultural logie of a modern
soeiety.
This eoneeptualization allows us to taekle the problem of pathological
developments in a more promising way. Although associations "Iearn"
and social dasses "struggle" with eaeh other, modernization nevertheless
fails. Nationalism mobilizes expressive resources that are not rationalized
by the former factors. Fascism mobilizes sentiments that cannot be con-
trolIed by the modern political and social movements. But wh)' do such
pathological developments oecur? Why are learning processes blocked?
Why is dass conRiet negated? What are the eultural foundations that
make possible such outcomes?
A provisional answer to these questions ean be given here. Ultimately,
it is the symbolie universe in whieh a soeiety lives that seems to be the
decisive faetor in determining whether modernization, onee triggered
and set into motion, will aetually sueeeed or not. Variations coneerning
the degree of associational life and dass conRiets in modern soeieties
raise seeondary questions: Why is there no socialism in the United States?
Why is there such a st.rong tradition of dass conftiet in England? Such
factors determine the tempo of modernization and the injustice tied to it.
But they do not block modernization.
The crucial question, then, is why modernization in some sOCletles
within this reaeh of variations fails-at least for some time. It does so
because there are eultural traditions that become dominant in specific
phases of modernization. An example is the German modernization
experience in the second half of the nineteenth and the first half of the
twentieth centuries.50 Although starting modernization like the other·
European nations, collective learning processes and social struggles over
the cultural orientation of modernization were blocked in favor of a civil
society that was controlIed by the state. The state lOok tight control over
associations, thereby controlling eollective learning processes. The state
also neutralized dass conftict, thereby imposing a symbolic order on
49. This critique of an elirist or populist transformation of dass conRiet is found. tor
cxamplc, in Touraine 1981.
50. For a discussion of the concept of social pathology see Eder 1985a; far lhe idca of
blocked learning processes as indicatorsof social pathology see Miller 1986.
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modern soeietv. The modern culture was created in an authoritarian
manner. And 'as long as this type of creation remains dominant the
possibility of pathological cultural evolution exists. .
Therefore. the kev to explaining the path of development leadmg
into modernitv lies i~ the learning processes and the symbolie practices
in the sphere 'of culture. These processes and practices determine not
only the type of rationalization (disenchantment or reenchantme.nt) that
will take place, thereby restricting the possibilities of structural dIfferen-
tiation, but they also determine the degree of rationality. Thus we will be
able to regard' the eounterproeesses to funetional differentiation and
formal rationalization not as simple aberrationsS1 from the path of mod-
ernization but as possible outcomes of modernization. The normality of
differentiation and rationalization is preeisely not the point. The ques-
tion of normality and pathology is rather a guestion of the soeia.1 co~di­
tions generating differentiation and rationalization. Onl)' by takmg mto
accoum the conditions that block collective learning processes and sym-
bolic struggles will we be able lo explain pathogenetic forms of differen-
tiation or dedifferentiation, of disenchantment or reenehantment. .
The deseription of modernizing processes as pathogenetie develop-
ments whieh is much in voaue today, is a eommunication about the
,0·
eonditions that trigger colleetive learning processes and change the uni-
verse of discourse used in dass eonRiet as a means of legitimating prae-
tiees. Such eommunication, defined as the eondition of rationality, about
the pathogenesis of modernity cannot exdude. but can minimize, the.
possibility for the pathogenesis of modernity.
4. CONTRADICTIONS A0iD EVOLUTIO~
4.1. A TheoreticalTreatment 0/ Contradictions-
The foregoing analysis uf the social produetion of modernity has !~d to an
analysis on three levels: eollective learning processes, dass confllct, and
reproductive structures. This analytieal distinetion of level~ ~llows for
localizing both the strueture and the funetioning of co~tra?lCtiOn~s ~he
mechanism for originating and reproducing commul1lcatl~n.Thl~ 1m-
plieit notion of contradiction must be clarified in the followmg secuons.
Contradiction can be defined as a soeial event where somebody op-
poses what somebody else says. This definition leads to a fi:st ~hesis: .the
notion of contradiction presupposes the notion of commumeatlon. "YIt~­
out communication contradiction is a meaningless category. Onl)' wlthm
.... .51. Ahhough il has oflen becn mcntioncd that different paths to ~odernizationcannot
bc reduced tO aberrations from a master trend leading to modernlty. seidom have the
. necessary theoretical consequenc.'es of this observation been considered.
52. For the centrality of the concept of eommunication for a soeiological theory see-
eaeh following different intentions-Habennas 1981 and Luhmann 1984. For the eultural
anthropological point ofview see Leaeh 1976. In the following I draw heavily on Miller 1986.
53. To insist on the differenee between group and dass implies the eritique of dassical
eonRiet theory as developed by. for example, Dahrendorf (1959).
54. This point is onethat Luhmann especially emphasizes. See Luhmann 1984 (i91ff.,
498ff.). -
a communicative relationship can contradiction occur at all.52 This thesis
leads to the following corollary: contradictions work on different levels
of social reality.
On the level of associations contradiction is the meehanism by which
participants in a collective discourse ean construct a shared world ofmean-
ings. Such a shared world relies on eonerete interaction, whieh forees
those engaged in it inta a logie that transcends their personal involvement
and egoistic interests. A communication on the level of concrete interac-
tion that uses the mechanism of contradiction is bound ta the logic of
argumentation. Argumentation is in turn a mechanism that binds all en-
gaged in it to a collective reality, one defined by the learning process
triggered by communication. Thus contradictions are fun~amentalfor a
first type of social reality: the reality of social groups. On thls level we have
to deal with concrete actors trying to communicate with each other.
But contradietion can be pushed to the point where argumentation is
itself put inta question: one side can argue against further argumenta-
tion and start to reson to power. The reproduction of eomrnunieation in
the group is interrupted. A substitute for the soeial basis of communiea-
tion must therefore be found. The new basis is eonstituted not by social
relations between persons but between dasses of persons. On this level
eommunieation is a meehanism for loeating and relocating dasses in
relation to each other. The mechanisms that force social classes to com-
munieate, that is, to struggle, with eaeh other are those of the market-
place beeause those who do not partieipaie are necessarily the losers of
the <Tarne. But at the same time this situation forces institutional agree-
men~s in order to feproduee the marketplace. Generating distinetions,
that is, a world of so~ial classifieation, is the result of eomrnunieation on
this level. Thus contradictions are fundamental for a second type of
soci'al reality: the reality of"social dasses.53 On this level we have to deal
with social dasses communicating by struggling with each other.
But there is still another type of contradiction that eseapes the descrip-
tion of contradictions given so far. These are the contradictions built into
the structural effects of group and dass action, into differentiation and
rationalization. This level of contradiction is not the same as a contradic-
tion between society and its environment because society cannot contra-
dict its environment:54 the environment is defined by the fact that it does
7F7?'.
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not communicate. The contradiction I mean is still within societ\'. Th us
we arrive at the broadest and most fundamental level of social co~tradic­
tions: the level of structural contradictions that constitute the social real-
ity of society. Structural contradictions do not constitute eommunication.
But because they are communicated they allow for the reproduction of
eommunication both on the level of group and on the level of dass.
The levels of the communicative constitution of social reality can be
summarized as folIows: .
-:The first level eoncerns contradictions between actors communicat-
ing with each other. This level constitutes the social realit\· of the
group and the learning processes triggered by commu~ication
between actors.
- The second level concerns contradictions between groups engaaed
in dassifying and redassifying each other. This level constit~tes
. the social reality of dass and the social struggles going on be-
tween classes.
- The third level concerns contradictions built into the developmen-
tal processes that are the structural effects of learning and dass
conRict. This level constitutes the social reality of soeiety.
Contradictions on all three levels work together to produce social
evolution. The implications of this conceptualization for the theor\' of
social evolution ean now be darified. .
4.2. Contradictions and Social Change
This diseussion of the communicative function of contradictions on dif-
ferent levels of social reality shows that contradietions are the medium
and the telos of communieation. The telos of eommunieation is not the
resolution of the eontradiction-for that would imply the end ofcomm~-' "
nication. Ralhc::r it is to reproduce communication, to assure an ongoing
stream of eommunication. This ongoing stream of communication
means that social reality is something that is always in Rux.
This relationship between contradiction and communication opens
up a new theoretical perspective on social change. The second thesis
concerning a theory of social change folIows: contradictions generate
social change and these changes are the mechanisms of e\'0Iution.55 This
proposition differs from usual conceptions of social change in one funda-
mental respect: it tries to explain change not by changes in factors out-
side the system but by internal generating mechanisms. Social change is
, ~">. 55. The difference between my approach and the Marxist strateg)' eonsists in diffcrcmi-
" atmg between the changes produced and the evolutionary proeess that handles these
.:. ehanges. My approach avoids~e problem of "misplaced concreteness," which is tied LO
-. theories that try to deduee social developments direetly from obser\"ed actions.
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itself a social producL A corollary of this general assumption is as fol-
lows: contradictions are constitutive of social change; they produce social
change in the process of constituting social reality.56
Social change is constituted on the level of association by the very fact
of contradicting. Communication exerts a specific constraint: it forc.es
those participating in communication to learn or not to learn. ContradIC-
tions can be used to reinterpret the world; if this use is dedined, those
engaged in the communication must. explicitly ne?"ate th~ possibility of
learning that is offered to therr.. In elther case sOCla! realny changes. In
this problem, the theory of practical discourse has its generic field of
application: it is an ideal model of the constitution of social reality. lt
leaves the other levels of sodaI realiry to other theories, such as systems
theorv.57 Contradictions on this first level produce social change by trig-
gering collective learning processes.58 ..
But these learning processe:; do not suffice to explam sOCla] change
because not every Jearning process survives on the level of the institu-
tional order. Social change can therefore be seen on the level of the
institutional order as the result of struggles between groups interested in
dassifving or redassifying others or themselves. Contradictions on this
second level produce social change by forcing social dasses into dass
confiicts.59
These conflicts, whether they are described as dass struggles or as
forms of status politics, have structural effects beyond their inten~ed
effects. The structure of communication producing these effects gl\'es
rise to a type of contradiction beyond the actors and classes of actors.
Contradictions on tne level of the reproduction of the conditions gen-.
erating society produce social and cultural change by mobili~ing .an-
tagonistic models of reproduction (i.e., dif~e_rentiation and ratlonahz~-
56. Here, some possible misunderstandings shouid be mentioned .. Th~ centraiity of
contradiction dces not impl)" that contradiction is the guarantor of rauonahty; those who
contradict do not necessarily understand those whom they contradict. This also applies to
contradictions in dass conflict; the result of dass conflict is not rational per se. And the
same applies for the idea of rationalization; the empirically .g~v~n process of.r~tionalization
(what is real) is not necessarily rational. None of these empmClst presupposltlons has to be
made. The onl)' thing that counts is the fact of contradiction. Reality is nothing but the
environment, which is a continual resource for changing the conceptions of reality.
57. This is the theoretical strategy of Habermas (1981), who is working with twO diffe:-
ent theories at the same time; the difference between these theories is established by thelr
normative difference.
58. A systematic account of this term is given by !..liIler 1986. See also Eder 1985a,
1986b.
59.' The theoretical treatment of classification leaves open the question of the mode of
differentiation used in dassification. Whether there is functional, segmentary, or other
differentiation remains to be seen. FOT a'specialtreatment see Schwartz 1981. .
tion) that take for their theme the structural basis of communication.60
Thus Marx's idea of the contradiction between the social relations of
production and the forces of produetion is abstracted to become a
contradiction between the antagonistic forms of differentiation and ra-
tionalization that are to be specified on each level of the evolution of
society.
4.3. Evoliltz"ona1)' Mechanisms
This discussion still leaves open the problem of ho\\" contradictions Oll
the different levels of realit)' are related to one another. Ho\\" are contra-
dictions that generate learning processes related to contradictions on the
level of dass conRiet? And how are the contradictions on this level re-
lated to contradictions on the level of the reproduction of society? This
problem leads to a third thesis: the social changes on these different
levels are the mechanisms of social evolution.6! Evolutionary changes are
the result of the combined effects of contradictions producing changes
on different levels of social reality.
This thesis implies that it is neither collective learning processes nor
dass conRict nor structural strains alone that explain the evolution of
society but their evolutionary interaction. Collective learning processes
function like the mechanism of mutation, offering varying patterns of
social reality produced in various social groups. Class conRict functions
like the mechanism of selection, favoring the patterns of sociaI distinc-
tions that will be integrated into the institutional system of society. Differ-
entiation and rationalization function like the mechanism of reproduc-
tive isolation, stabilizing the system of society.
But there is a problem in grafting such an evolutionary-style theory,
weIl designed though it may be for biological evolution, onto the pro-
cess of social change. The processes described are not tied to a specific
~_~.~-~ evolutionary mechanism. The evolutionary mechanisms these processes
serve are interchangeable. This implies that learning processes, dass
conRicts, and structural antagonisms can aIl be selection environments.
And mutations can result from any of the social processes mentioned.
The same reasoning is valid for the mechanism of reproductive isola~
60. This observation points to the central place that a theory of reproduction has for
sociological theorizing. A sociology of culture is a necessary and important part of such a
theory of reproduction, but it has to be complemented by a sociology of social structure. A
new approach to such a sociology can be found in Bourdieu 1980, who works with the
" concept of a social topology. He speaks. in a manner similar lO the language of diffcr-
:- entation theory, about the logic ofdifferent fields of action. and of the homologies concern-
" ing the social positions in these fields and the homologies of these fields within the general
'SOciety-both ofwhich reproduce a dassified reality.
-::. 61. For these discussions on t]{e relevance of the biological model see Plotkin 1982; for a
. ";"sociol, )cal application see Eder 1987.
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tion (stabilization). The possible recombinations of mechanisms and
processes thus strongl)' suggest a theory of evolution with a highly
complex structure.
An important coroHary goes along with this theory of evolution: given
these mechanisms, astriet Darwinian theory, which may be defined as a
theory that assumes no relation between mutation conditions and selec-
tion conditions,52 is not feasible. A Lamarckian theory would work bet-
ter. The Lamarckian approach, which assumes a strong relation between
mutation conditions and selection canditions, is better suited for explain-
ing the interchangeability of mechanisms and processes in the theor)' of
social evolution. It would aHow us to anticipate that the mechanism of
stabilization could be transformed into the mechanism of mutation as
soon as structural ant~gonisms became the topic of communication in
groups. Or it would aHow us to anticipate that the mechanism of stabiliza-
tion could be transformed into the mechanism of selection as soon as the
description of structural antagonisms became a weapon in the hands of
one dass of actors against another dass of actors.
The analysis of modernization, then, demands a much more sophisti-
cated theor}' of evolution. Evolutionary theory, itself a produet of mod-
ernization, is a way of describing modern society. As such, it must take
into account the force of coHective action. It must also take imo account
the dimension of social and cultural conRict. And it must be able to
account for the success or failure of historical developmems. It would
seem that only an evolutionary~iheory that leaves open the question of
what a modern order is about and that concemrates on the question of
the social production' of modernity will be able to grasp the changes
occurring in society. These are changes that, after aH, often contradict
the theory of modernization that sociologists have formulated concern-
ing this type of society. But perhaps this contradiction is still another
mechanism of change in modern society.
REFERENCES
Beck. U. 1983. Jenseits von Stand und Klasse? In Soz.iale Ungleichheiten. Sonderband
2 der Sozialen Welt, ed. R. Kreckel, 25-73. Göttingen: Schwartz.
Berman. M. 1984. The reenchantment of tlu: world. New York: Free Press.·
Bourdieu. P. 1980. Le sens pratique. Paris: Les Editions de Minuit.
---. 1984. The distinction.· A social critique of the judgment of taste. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press. .
Calhoun. C. 1982. The question ofdass struggle: Sucial foundations ofpopular rad/cal·
ism during (he industrial rt'lIolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
62. See Harre 1980 (293ff.).
Colomy, P. 1985. Uneven structural differentiation: To\\"ard a comparative
approach. In Neofunctionalism, ed. J. Alexander, 130-56. Beverly Hills:
Sage.
Dahrendorf, R. 1959. Gass and dass confliet in indus/rialsociety. 6th ed. Stanford:
Stanford University Press.
Dumont. L. 1965. The modern conception ofthe individual: Notes on its genesis
and that of concomitant institutions. Contributions to Indian Sociolog)' 8: 13-61.
---. 1967. Homo hierarchicus. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
---. 1970. Religion, politics, and society in the individualistic universe. Pro-
ceeding.l of the Royal Anthmpologicai hl.llitutiom of Grea! Britain ami /reiand,
1970,31-41.
Durkheim, E. 1950. Le(o/ls de Sociulogie. Physique de.l moeurs ct du drait. Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France.
Eder, K. 1982. A new social movement? Telos 52:5-20.
---. 1985a. Geschichte als Lemprozeß? Zur Pathogencse ,bolitischer Modernität in
Deutschland. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
---. 1985b. The "new social movemems": Moral crusades. political pressure
groups. or social movements? Social Rese01'ch 52:869-90.
---. 1986a. Der permanente Gesellschaftsvertrag. Zur Kritik der ökono-
mischen Theorie des Sozialen. In Gerechtigkeit, Diskws uder Markt? Dir neuen
Ansätze in der Vertragstheorie. ed. L. Kern and H.-P. Müller. 67-81. Opladen:
'Westdeutscher Verlag.
---. 1986b. Soziale Bewegung und kulturelle Evolution. Überlegungen zur
Rolle der neuen sozialen Bewegungen in der kulturellen Evolution der Mod-
_erne. In Die Modeme-Kontinuitäten und Zäsuren. Sonderband 4 _der Sozialen We(t,
ed.J. Berger, 335-5i. Göttingen: Schwartz.
---. 198i. Learning and the evolution of social systems. An epigenetic per-
spective. In Evolutionar)" theoT)' in social science, ed. M. Schmid and F. M.
Wuketis. 101-25. Dordrecht: ReideI.
Eisenstadt, S. N. 1981. Cultural traditions and political dynamics: The origins
and modes of ideologicalpolitics. BritishJournal ofSoeiolog)' 32: 155-81.
Elster. J. 1978. Logic and society. New York: Witey.
Galtung, J. 1986. The green movement: A socio-historical explanation.lntema-
tional Sociolag)' l:i5-90.
Godelier, M. 1973. System, Struktur und Widerspruch im Kapital. In Öko-'
nomische Anthropologie. Untersuchungen zum Begriff der sozialen Struktur primitiver
Gesellschaften, by M. Godelier, 138-72. Reinbek. W. Ger.: Rowohlt.
-. 1978. Infrastructures, societies, and history. Current Anthropology 19:
763-68.
Habermas, J. 1962. Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Neuwied: Luchterhand.
-. 1979. Communication and the evolution ofsociet)".· Boston: Beacon Press.
-. 1981. Tlu:orie des kommunikativen Handeins. 2 vols. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Harre, R. 1980. Social being and social change. In The stTUeture of action, ed. M.
Brenner, 287-312. Oxford: Blackwell. .
_~}{intze. O. 1970. Staat und Velfassimg. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Rupre~ht.
. . Kendall, W. 1975. The labour mbvement in Europe. London: Allen Lane.
Kohlberg, L. 1981. The philusoph)' of moral del'C!opment: Moral stages and Ihe idea of
justiee. San Franeisco: Harper and Ro\\".
Koselleek. R. [1959] 1973. Kritik und Krise. Eine Studie zur Pathogenese dn
bürgerlichen Hell. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Kumar, K. 1983. Class and politiear aetion in nineteenth-eenturv England : Theo-
retieal and eomparative perspeetives. Archives Europeennes de Soeiologie 24:3-43.
Leaeh, E. 1976. Cullure and c01Tl1lluniwtion: The logie by which s)'Illbols aJ'l' colI1wcted.
Cambridge: Cambridge Universin' Press.
Lechner, F. J. 1985. Modernity and its discontents. In Neofunctionalism, ed. J.
Alexander, 157-76. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Luhmann, !\. 1982. The differentiation of societ,\'. :\ew York: Columbia Cniversit)'
Press.
---. 1984. Sozial,' Syste1l/e. Grundriß eil/i'!' allgemeinen Theorie. Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp.
---. 1985.. Zum Begriff der sozialen Klasse. In Soziale Differenzierung, ed. :'\.
Luhmann, 119-62. Opladen, W. Ger.": \Vestdeutscher Verlag.
MarshalI. T. H. 1950. CitizenshijJ aud social dass. Cambridge: Cambridge LJnil'er·
sity Press,
Miller, M. 1986. Kollektive Lernp7'ozesse-Studien zur Grundlegung einer sozio-
logischen Lemlheone. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
l\'1oscovici, S. 1976. Die \Viederverzauberung der Welt. In Jenseits dn Krise. Wider
das politische Defizit der Ökologie, ed. A. Touraine et al., 94-131. Frankfurt:
Syndikat.
Mousnier. R. 1974. Les illStitutiom de la Franee sous la m01wrchie absolut'. Vol. 1,
Societe et Etat, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
---. 1980. Les institutiom de 10. France sous la'monarchie absolue. Vol. 2, Les classes
sociales. Paris: Presses Universitaires de Franee.
Na'aman, S. 1978. Zu,' Entstehung der dl'utsclren Arbeiteroewegung, Lernproz.esse und
Vergesellschaftung. 1830-1868. Hannover: SOAK.
Nipperdey, T. 1972. Verein als soziale Struktur in Deutschland im späten 18. und
frühen .. 19. Jahrhundert. In Geschichtsu1issemchaft und Vereimwesen im 19.
Jahrhundert, ed. H. Booekmann et a1. , 1-44. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and
Ruprecht.
Offe, C. 1972. Strukturprobleme des kapitalistischen Staates. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
---. 1985. New social movements: Challenging the boundaries of institutional
polities. Social Research 52:817-68.
Plotkin, H. C., ed. 1982. Learning, development, and cultw·e. Chichester: Wiley.
Sahlins, M. 1976. Culture and practical reason. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Schluchter, W. 1979. The paradoxes of rationalization. In Max Weber's vision of
history, ed. G. Roth and W. Schluehter, 11-64. Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press.
---. 19~1. The rue of ",estern ratiolUllism: Max Weber's developmental histoT)·.
Berkeley: University of Califomia Press.
Schmid, M. 1982. Habermas' theory of sucial evolution. In HabeT"fTlm: Critit:l11
debates, ed. j. B. Thompson and D. Held, 162-80. London: Macmillan..
Schwartz B 198 I \i'l'ti I I ;(, .
knuwledIT; Chic~ . ~~I .e alJ'J1callOlI,: /: study ill stl"i/cluralislIl alld i1l thl' .IOcivlOl{r o(
• ö . < go. ulllVerSI[\' 01 ChlCa(TO Press '. .
SJoeberg G 1960 C d" . '" .
.. .' ontra let01')' funeuonal reqllirements ;md < '"
launzal of Confilcl Resolution 4: 198-208. . .OCl<! S\·Slems.
Sklcnner
b
, ~. 197~ .. The fOUl/da/ions vf modem pofitiCCIllhour;ht. 2 \'ols C' b ,'d .
am ndge UmverSltv Press. <. am 11 ge.
Smelser !\ J 198- E· f .
to ed~c~t;onal::>~ha\na ~ait~nfhlhe ~]]ocJe] of structural differentiation in relation
Alexander 113 ~O gBe, I eH?llmeSleenth centun·. 1n .\('vjimelivllalism, ed. J
, -v. 'er I' I s' aue .Tl ' . ~.l~;:i~~~: E. P. 1968. The making 0/ t!ll' EnglisJz ü'orkill!! dass. Harmondswonh.
---. 1974. Patrieian soeien' pleb . I ) , .
___ l(r8 E' . .' e1311ClI ture. olln/{l/ofSoewiHisiorrj:382_40~
. • I. Ighteenth-cemun' English . Cl . :J.
Social Histal)' 3: 133-64. . . sOClety: ass struggle without dass.
TilJv C 1978 F b'l"
Ti ".' . I'Om mo I Iza/ZOI/ to r{'lIo{lItion. Readill<T. \ja«' 'ddir( '\.- Iollrame' I9~~ T.' r 1::' _.. ,"l. .'U!!- \ p< p,'
P . 1'l.. 11. lIe selj-prodllction vf lucirt... Chicago' Cni\"ersitl" of ~C"'l~:"ress. . . . llCago
---. 1981. T!le voice and the (')'1'. Ne\\' \'ork' Cambrl'dge L" . PTu dh E 1980 .- . 11l\'ersltl· ress.f~n m:~~r~en R~~~tr ~~.twlCkl~ng \'on moralischen Begründu~gsstrukturen
Folge) 14: 1-20. . chlv fUl Rechts· ul/d Soz.lOlpJzilosophie (beiheft neue
Vester, M. 1970. Dip El1tslehul/f:; des Proletariats al L .
antikapitaliitischer Theorie und'-P' . . 'E I .' e1'llpro:eß. Dic Entstehung
. . laxlS IU ng a1/e
'
1 7 9" 1ö48 F kf
ropäische Verlagsanstalt. <, ,~- • ran' Urt: Eu-
Wallaee, A. F. 1972. Paradigmatie pr . I
-pologist 74:467-78. oeesses m eil ture change. American AlIthro-
Werblowsh R r 1976 B d d" - .
changing ~'o"id..Lond~n: ~~~I tm ;tlOl1 and modemily: Changing 7'eligiol',s in a
Y' one ress.
mger.J. \1. 1982. Countercultures' Th p . d l .
down. Ne\\' York: Free Press. . I' ramISe an t le penl ofa l.l'orld tllrned upsid,'
3-19CO:\TRADICTIO:\S.-\;,\;O SOCIAL E\'()Ll"[IO:\
EDER348
